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Participants – non-Commission: The Honorable Stapleton Roy

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(U) BACKGROUND

(U) He started work in the Intelligence Community (IC) in 1956 by serving two years at the State Dept.'s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). He subsequently received Chinese language training and served in various East Asian assignments. He was trained in Mongolian and Russian and served in related assignments. From 1969-1972, he served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. From 1972-1974, he was the Deputy Director of the Soviet Desk. He went to the National War College in 1974 and subsequently served on the China desk. He subsequently was Deputy Chief of Mission in Thailand and was Ambassador to Singapore. He became Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Ambassador to China and Indonesia. In 1999, he became Assistant Secretary of State for INR. He retired in December 2000 and currently is at Kissinger Associates.

(U) MANAGEMENT OF THE IC

(U) He believes that we have a very good IC. Management in the IC has never gotten to the point of dysfunctionality. The IC has the diversity necessary to avoid a single view of complex issues. There is better interagency liaison – both human and electronic – than elsewhere in the U.S. Government.

(U) Inherent problems have to be managed – they cannot be eliminated. In Bangkok, he oversaw antidrug efforts [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [redacted] and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). There is a fundamental disconnect between enforcers and collectors. It is inherent and must be managed. There must be distrust between agencies that have divergent objectives (for example, intelligence agencies are concerned that enforcement agencies will divulge sources). There is a risk of breakdown

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at any point, particularly because you do not have enough information to decide what to do. With respect to 911, we lacked information to decide what to do.

(U) There is a problem of people not being trained to confront transnational threats. The bureaucratic system has an informal assignment of importance from a career-track perspective. For example, CIA is not focused on antidrug issues. Also, there are bureaucratic turf issues. For example, the Customs Commissioner wants Customs to do counternarcotics. If you have narrow, turf-oriented people rather than goal-oriented people, you cannot succeed. In Beijing, his country-team really pulled together – it is a model for what should happen in Washington. The Ambassador is in charge of the country-team and helps pull things together. In practical terms, there is no one in charge of the IC.

(U) It is “idiotic” that you cannot send a classified email around the federal government.

(U) INR AND THE IC

(S) INR is the only component of the State Dept. that is part of the IC. INR is the only repository of information in the U.S. Government regarding smaller countries. [redacted]

[redacted] State does have embassies everywhere. INR had a problem-free relationship with the FBI. INR did not share IC information with the FBI. INR represented the State Dept. at meetings at the White House about special activities.

(S) INR had a unit for intelligence support to the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism (S/CT). As Assistant Secretary of INR, he needed to make sure that INR and S/CT worked together. S/CT had its own intelligence liaison, and INR would give S/CT intelligence support. Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism Mike Sheehan would go to interagency IC meetings, perhaps with an INR analyst alongside.

(U) INR people worked with the DCI's Counterterrorist Center (CTC). INR did not task CTC but might send an analyst to help draft a document. INR is not operational, while S/CT and CTC are more operational.

(U) INR can task collection by being in position to contribute to the tasking process.

(U) WARNING

(S) With respect to the *Cole*, we had forewarning but lacked specificity of time and place. Without specificity, all you can do is thrash about, and that is dangerous in and of itself.

(S) When he was Ambassador to Indonesia, the U.S. was in a “low-grade war” with Iraq which meant that the embassy had to be on a high alert posture. The embassy would receive vague threat warnings. What was he supposed to do, aside from what he was already doing? The IC was just doing “CYA” and “crying wolf.” If information had more specificity, then action could be taken. The U.S. Government tends to let its guard down, and “crying wolf cables” do not help matters. There needs to be a better way to

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raise awareness, such as having inspections. In sum, if he got a vague warning, he would not do much in response.

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[REDACTED] He briefed U.S. businessmen in Indonesia – you cannot increase embassy security without telling the U.S. citizens there about it.

(S) After the East African embassy bombings, there were discussions with security experts to increase embassy security. The Indonesians ensured that the embassy had setbacks.

(U) THE DCI'S DECLARATION OF WAR

(S) He was aware of al Qa'ida when the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) issued the "declaration of war" memorandum in 1998. He cannot recall the memorandum, although he had considered the concept of a war on terrorism for a long time [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He does not like the notion of a "war" on terrorism, which implies that there will be victory or defeat. Rather, terrorism is like crime – it will always exist and needs to be managed. A certain amount of crime is a function of freedom; as China loosened control, a certain amount of crime started. But having a certain level of crime is different from being a "crime-ridden" place with poverty, gangs, etc. We need to attack the root causes of terrorism. Our alliance with Israel is one cause of terrorism against us. He cited the British dealing with the Irish Republican Army by working on some of the root causes.

(U) THE QUALITY OF ANALYSIS

(U) The biggest problem is the obscuration of being able to emphasize the difference between what you know and what you don't know. The ability to maintain a sophisticated understanding of what you know and what you don't know is one of the most difficult challenges for the IC because of the pressure to generate assumptions from what you do know to what you do not know. The absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence; 911 is a classic case.

(S) The IC should provide both open source intelligence and the secret pinpricks (HUMINT, SIGINT, etc.). "Intelligence" should not just be clandestinely-acquired sources but should include open source information. However, in practice "it doesn't usually work like that." He cited the example of a comment by the Chinese president about Chinese intentions not be included in an IC report on the matter at hand. Sometimes the most important information is sent as eyes-only cables and may not even get sent to the IC in the first place.

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~~(S)~~ You never have adequate information on a country. His focus was not on intelligence but rather on using open source information to grasp the situation and then using intelligence to fill in the gaps. That is the proper way to approach it. If you cannot read open source correctly, then you cannot interpret intelligence correctly. This view on the use of intelligence applies to transnational threats as well.

(U) The issue is not resources but rather that reporting and analysis are up against powerful political pressures. Many of the things that the IC reports about are done in reaction to U.S. policy, but the IC is too afraid to say so. For example, the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan led China to sell weapons to Pakistan.

~~(S)~~ The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) was well-integrated into the IC. INR had inherited the analytic arm of the U.S. Information Agency, which included an international polling capability to do open-source polling and which produced marvelous information. INR helped design the questions for the polling.

(U) The Dept. of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (DHS/IAIP) Directorate is "all wrong." It should be like S/CT in State – it should not try to duplicate the IC, at least not on collection. DHS/IAIP may need an analytic unit like INR – just like the IC does not cover all of the countries that INR is interested in, so DHS/IAIP may not receive analytic product from the IC about all the products DHS/IAIP is interested in. The IC should have a unit in DHS/IAIP.

(U) COLLECTION

~~(S)~~ You cannot just rely on SIGINT and HUMINT – they are not secret anymore, and they can be overcome by denial and deception (for example, the Indian nuclear tests).


(U) HUMINT

~~(TS/HCS/NF)~~ He served as Ambassador from January 1996 to September 1999.

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
He disagreed with giving up coverage, as it is easier to build up a small capability than to start from scratch. He acknowledged that there are political problems with working against organizations with Islamic connections in Islamic countries.

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(U) SIGINT



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(U) IMINT

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(U) THE INTELLIGENCE/POLICY NEXUS

(U) There is a problem of decisionmaking: some people in the IC seize upon one piece of information and push it beyond where it goes. Some people in the IC are conservative. Some people in policy would like to push past the limit of the intelligence criticize the IC for being too conservative.

(U) Another problem in intelligence is that you never have all of the information you want and in most cases you have far less intelligence than you need, so you usually have to make decisions on little information.

~~(S)~~ There is a failure to integrate the totality of information. Lots of people use intelligence without realizing that intelligence is "ephemeral."

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(U) The problem of the electronic age: how to manage information which is dangerous if not understood. Policymakers want raw information, but they do not understand that intelligence always changes after the first impression.

~~(S)~~ The IC did not properly caveat its analysis concerning Iraqi WMD that there were dissents. There would have been leaks beforehand (that there were dissents) if otherwise. The Iraqi WMD situation was an intelligence failure because the IC's caveats were not on the summaries of intelligence.

(U) There is always the need to compromise between the need for speed to get information to the principals, and the need to have analysis give context to the information despite the time-lag. The people who move the information need to have the ability to give it some context.

~~(S)~~ Intelligence is sometimes contradictory. He also cited the example of the failed coup in Panama in Sept. 1989 in which the embassy, defense attaché [redacted] were all sending contradictory information back to Washington.

(U) 911

(U) 911 was equivalent to the use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Terrorists came up with an ingenious way of substituting non-WMD for WMD.

(U) The problem with counterterrorism was not analysis and the ability to integrate information – it was collection. He never thought that analysis was distorted. When there is insufficient information, then you need models that based on assumptions.

(U) 911 was not a failure of intelligence, rather the political leadership did give the IC the budget necessary to combat terrorism. 911 is also not a matter of the DCI failing to do what he should have done. We did not have the intelligence about the threat, but that was a failure of the political process. The DCI could have argued for more resources, but how could he have taken-on the President and the Office of Management and Budget. We were already behind by 2000. We are 10-12 years late in recognizing that we live in a dangerous world.

~~(S)~~ Counterterrorism and al Qa'ida were such a high priority for the IC. The National Intelligence Council saw the risk of a domestic terrorist attack as the number-one priority (based on an informal conversation he had). The threat of terrorism was seen as a threat to the U.S. domestically. He got the impression that the IC was doing all it could.

(U) COUNTERTERRORISM AND LARGE POLICY ISSUES

(U) We cannot win the battle of hearts and minds – there is a cultural barrier that cannot be overcome. The ads created by the State Dept. were a disaster. We tried to show how Muslims were integrated into the West, but the ads fed Muslim criticism of the West as co-opting Muslims. We need to have Muslims as part of the strategy.

(U) Preemption is critical given the threat of WMD, but if you cannot define the criteria under which it is done, then it is not a doctrine – and we have not defined it vis-à-vis India, etc. Also, preemption is only as good as the intelligence that enables it. Finally, rogue states may rush to develop WMD in order to preempt preemption (for example, North Korea). We should not talk about the doctrine of preemption but rather just have the capability to do so if necessary.

(U) We have a societal problem – we have not decided if we want to go unilaterally or rather rely on the international community – he asked why we have such a huge defense budget. NATO has changed – there is no real threat, and its borders are no longer defensible (for 50 years, NATO had credible borders) – NATO has become a collective security organization.

(U) ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES TO THE IC

(U) He is skeptical as to whether it makes sense to create a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). He is concerned with how to make the intelligence apparatus

compatible with U.S. freedoms. He noted that the KGB was a department of homeland security but lacked the checks-and-balances in the U.S. system. He was skeptical that placing one person in charge of the IC would increase accountability. Due to the divide between law enforcement and intelligence over the last 2 decades, accountability has eroded. The FBI is expanding overseas, but FBI is not as interested in intelligence. How would a DNI handle interface with FBI? A DNI would not trust the FBI.

(U) The DNI might foster groupthink. There needs to be checks and balances. Yet with J. Edgar Hoover, balances did not work – that is the risk of a DNI, especially when secrecy is involved.

(U) DEA is interesting to look at, but it is narrowly focused and has internal corruption issues.

(U) In today's world, you cannot maintain the intelligence/law enforcement divide. You either need one agency overseas, or you need better management. It's a management issue, not an organizational issue. Reorganization is necessary when the organization generates problems.

(U) We need to look at other countries to see if they are models. The British protect information better than we can, and they also faced the IRA (an acute problem embedded in their society). We should look at Canada and Australia.

(U) The Scowcroft panel resulted in the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.

~~(S)~~ Is redundancy the answer to the divide between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense? The military has demands on IMINT and SIGINT that gobble them up. Ideally, some satellites would only be for the military. An organizational approach requires a 911 crisis – but 911 was not bad enough. 911 produced the Dept. of Homeland Security, which would never have occurred otherwise due to the number of Congressional oxen that were gored.

(U) ADVICE FOR FOREIGN TRAVEL

(U) Country-teams are a function of how the Ambassador runs the mission. Does the Ambassador pay attention to all parts of the country-team? He suggested that we first meet with the Ambassador and the country-team to get a sense of how they work together, then to meet with the members of the country-team separately, and then to give feedback to the Ambassador.